@article {1805516,
	title = {Climate Policy Reform Options in 2025},
	year = {2024},
	abstract = {With the expiration of many tax cuts and unmet climate targets, 2025 could be a crucial year for climate policy in the United States. Using an integrated model of energy supply and demand, this paper aims to assess climate policies that the U.S. federal government may consider in 2025 and to evaluate emissions reductions, fiscal costs and revenues, and household energy expenditures across a range of policy scenarios. Model results suggest that the emissions reductions of the Inflation Reduction Act are significantly augmented under scenarios that add a modest carbon fee or, to a lesser extent, that implement a clean electricity standard in the power sector. Second, net fiscal costs can be substantially reduced in scenarios that include a carbon fee, especially if fossil fuel exports are taxed. Third, expanding the IRA tax credits yields modest additional emissions reductions with higher fiscal costs. Finally, although none of the policy combinations across these scenarios achieve the U.S. target of a 50-52\% economy-wide emissions reduction by 2030 from 2005 levels, the carbon fee and clean electricity standard scenarios achieve these levels between 2030 and 2035.},
	url = {https://www.nber.org/papers/w32168},
	author = {John Bistline and Kimberly A. Clausing and Neil Mehrotra and Stock, James H. and Catherine Wolfram}
}
@article {1741256,
	title = {Anticipating Climate Change Across the United States},
	journal = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	number = {dp\_94},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {23-94},
	abstract = {We evaluate how anticipation and adaptation shape the aggregate and local costs of climate change. We develop a dynamic spatial model of the U.S. economy and its 3,143 counties that features costly forward-looking migration and capital investment decisions. Recent methodological advances that leverage the {\textquoteleft}Master Equation{\textquoteright} representation of the economy make the model tractable. We estimate the county-level impact of severe storms and heat waves over the 20th century on local income, population, and investment. The estimated impact of storms matches that of capital depreciation shocks in the model, while heat waves resemble combined amenity and productivity shocks. We then estimate migration and investment elasticities, as well as the structural damage functions, by matching these reduced-form results in our framework. Our findings show, first, that the impact of climate on capital depreciation magnifies the U.S. aggregate welfare costs of climate change twofold to nearly 5in 2023 under a business-as-usual warming scenario. Second, anticipation of future climate damages amplifies climate-induced worker and investment mobility, as workers and capitalists foresee the slow build-up of climate change. Third, migration reduces substantially the spatial variance in the welfare impact of climate change. Although both anticipation and migration are important for local impacts, their effect on aggregate U.S. losses from climate change is small.},
	author = {Adrien Bilal and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg}
}
@booklet {1651707,
	title = {Learning How to Build Back Better through Clean Energy Policy Evaluation},
	number = {dp\_93},
	year = {2022},
	abstract = {
	The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act authorized and appropriated unprecedented spending and tax expenditures to decarbonize the American economy. In the spirit of {\textquotedblleft}build back better,{\textquotedblright} this paper examines how integrating evaluation in the design and implementation of these new clean energy policies can facilitate the learning necessary for policymakers to make policy better over time. It draws lessons from two case studies: (1) on institutionalizing evaluation based on the experience with regulatory review, and (2) on conducting evaluation based on the research literature assessing the 2009 Recovery Act{\textquoteright}s clean energy programs. The paper identifies in recent legislation the programs and their characteristics amenable to various evaluation methodologies. The paper closes with recommendations for a clean energy program evaluation framework that would enable implementation of climate-oriented learning agendas under the Evidence-Based Policymaking Act.



	Keywords: program evaluation, learning agendas, renewable energy, energy efficiency

},
	author = {Aldy, Joseph E.}
}
@booklet {1651706,
	title = {The Evolving Role of Greenhouse Gas Emission Offsets in Combating Climate Change},
	number = {dp\_92},
	year = {2022},
	abstract = {
	As governments, firms, and universities advance ambitious greenhouse gas emission goals, the demand for emission offsets {\textendash} projects that reduce or remove emissions relative to a counterfactual scenario {\textendash} will increase. Reservations about an offset{\textquoteright}s additionality, permanence, double-counting, and leakage pose environmental, economic, and political challenges. We review the role of offsets in regulatory compliance, as an incentive for early action, and in implementing voluntary emission goals. The rules and institutions governing offsets drive large variations in prices and in the types of projects deployed to reduce or remove emissions across offset programs. A lack of carbon price convergence and potential information asymmetries may contribute to limited price discovery and market segmentation. Taking into account the financial properties of offsets, an array of financial and technological innovations could enhance offsets{\textquoteright} environmental integrity and promote liquid offset markets. Unresolved questions about the future of policy will influence the evolution of voluntary offsets markets. \&nbsp;\&nbsp;\&nbsp;



	Keywords: climate change, certified emission reductions, offsets, cap-and-trade, corporate social responsibility



	JEL Codes: Q54, Q52, Q58, H23

},
	author = {Aldy, Joseph E. and Halem, Zachery M}
}
@booklet {ramelli_investor_2021,
	title = {Investor Rewards to Climate Responsibility: Stock-Price Responses to the Opposite Shocks of the 2016 and 2020 U.S. Elections},
	number = {dp\_91},
	year = {2021},
	pages = {79},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	abstract = {Donald Trump{\textquoteright}s 2016 election and his nomination of climate skeptic Scott Pruitt to head the Environmental Protection Agency drastically downshifted expectations on U.S. policy toward climate change. Joseph Biden{\textquoteright}s 2020 election shifted them dramatically upward. We study firms{\textquoteright} stock-price movements in reaction. As expected, the 2016 election boosted carbon-intensive firms. Surprisingly, firms with climate-responsible strategies also gained, especially those firms held by long-run investors. Such investors appear to have bet on a {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}boomerang{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright} in climate policy. Harbingers of a boomerang already appeared during Trump{\textquoteright}s term. The 2020 election marked its arrival. (JEL G14, G38, G41)},
	author = {Ramelli, Stefano and Alexander Wagner and Ziegler, Alexandre and Zeckhauser, Richard}
}
@booklet {aldy_environmental_2021,
	title = {Environmental Benefit-Cost Analysis: A Comparative Analysis Between the United States and the United Kingdom},
	number = {dp\_21\_90},
	year = {2021},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	abstract = {The United States and United Kingdom have longstanding traditions in use of environmental benefit-cost analysis (E-BCA). While there are similarities between how E-BCA is utilized, there are significant differences too, many of which mirror ongoing debates and recent developments in the literature on environmental and natural resource economics. We review the use of E-BCA in both countries across three themes: (a) the role of long-term discounting; (b) the estimation and use of carbon valuation; and, (c) the estimation and use of the value of a statistical life. In each case, we discuss how academic developments are (and are not) translated into use and draw comparative lessons. We find that, in some cases, practical differences in E-BCA can be overstated, although in others these seem more substantive. Advances in the academic frontier also raise the question of when and how to update practical E-BCA, with very different answers across our themes.},
	author = {Aldy, Joseph E. and Atkinson, Giles and Kotchen, Matthew}
}
@article {aldy_co-benefits_2021,
	title = {Co-Benefits and Regulatory Impact Analysis: Theory and Evidence from Federal Air Quality Regulations},
	journal = {Discussion Paper},
	year = {2021},
	note = {dp_21_89},
	pages = {45},
	abstract = {This paper considers the treatment of co-benefits in benefit-cost analysis of federal air quality regulations. Using a comprehensive data set on all major Clean Air Act rules issued by the Environmental Protection Agency over the period 1997-2019, we show that (1) co-benefits make up a significant share of the monetized benefits; (2) among the categories of co-benefits, those associated with reductions in fine particulate matter are the most significant; and (3) co-benefits have been pivotal to the quantified net benefit calculation in nearly half of cases. Motivated by these trends, we develop a simple conceptual framework that illustrates a critical point: co-benefits are simply a semantic category of benefits that should be included in benefit-cost analyses. We also address common concerns about whether the inclusion of co-benefits is problematic because of alternative regulatory approaches that may be more cost-effective and the possibility for double counting.},
	author = {Aldy, Joseph and Kotchen, Matthew and Evans, Mary and Fowlie, Meredith and Levinson, Arik and Palmer, Karen}
}
@booklet {evans_role_2021,
	title = {The Role of Retrospective Analysis in an Era of Deregulation: Lessons from the U.S. Mercury Air Toxic Standards},
	number = {2021-88},
	year = {2021},
	note = {dp_88},
	pages = {10},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	abstract = {As of late 2020, the Trump administration had initiated almost one hundred rollbacks of U.S. environmental regulations. A careful assessment of the benefits and costs of rolling back an existing regulation can and should inform such decisions. When assessing the potential rollback of an existing regulation, analysts can often learn from the regulation{\textquoteright}s implementation through retrospective analysis as well as from advances in scientific knowledge. We discuss recent actions concerning the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) to illustrate the potential lessons from doing so. In the case of MATS, advances in science have shed light on broader exposure pathways and previously unquantified health effects, suggesting that the benefits of reducing mercury emissions may exceed previous estimates. At the same time, changes in the energy sector have altered the mix of fuels used to produce electricity, which impacts both the benefits and costs of the regulation.},
	author = {Evans, Mary and Palmer, Karen and Aldy, Joseph and Fowlie, Meredith and Kotchen, Matthew and Levinson, Arik}
}
@article {aldy_rolling_2020,
	title = {Rolling the Dice in the Corridors of Power: William Nordhaus{\textquoteright}s Impacts on Climate Change Policy},
	journal = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program Discussion Paper Series},
	year = {2020},
	abstract = {The seminal contributions of William Nordhaus to scholarship on the long-run macroeconomics of global climate change are clear. Much more challenging to identify are the impacts of Nordhaus and his research on public policy in this domain. We examine three conceptually distinct pathways for that influence: his personal participation in the policy world; his research{\textquoteright}s direct contribution to the formulation and evaluation of public policy; and his research{\textquoteright}s indirect role informing public policy. Many of the themes that emerge in this assessment of the contributions of one of the most important economists to have worked in the domain of climate change analysis apply more broadly to the roles played by other leading economists in this and other policy domains.},
	author = {Aldy, Joseph E. and Stavins, Robert N.}
}
@article {metcalf_measuring_2020,
	title = {Measuring the Macroeconomic Impact of Carbon Taxes},
	journal = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program Discussion Paper Series},
	year = {2020},
	abstract = {Economists have long argued that a carbon tax is a cost effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Increasingly, members of Congress agree. In 2019, seven carbon tax bills were filed in Congress (Kaufman et al., 2019). In addition, the Climate Leadership Council has built bipartisan support for a carbon tax and dividend plan (Baker et al., 2017). In contrast, the Trump Administration is retreating from any climate policy and has taken steps to withdraw from the Paris Accord, citing heavy economic costs to the U.S. economy from meeting the U.S. commitments made during the Obama Administration. In his June 1, 2017 statement on the Accord, for example, the President claimed that the cost to the economy would be {\textquotedblleft}close to \$3 trillion in lost GDP and 6.5 million industrial jobs{\textellipsis}{\textquotedblright} (Trump, 2017). What is the basis for claims about the economic impact of a carbon tax? Economic impacts of a carbon tax typically are estimated using computable general equilibrium (CGE) models (as was done for the report on which Trump based his claims). These models, while helpful, make many simplifying assumptions to remain tractable, including optimization, representative agents, and simplified expectations and dynamics, so at a minimum those estimates would ideally be complemented by empirical evidence on the macroeconomic effects of carbon taxes in practice. With carbon taxes in place in twenty-five countries around the world, including some dating to the early 1990s, empirical analysis of historical experience is now possible. This paper considers carbon taxes in Europe to estimate their impact on GDP and employment.},
	author = {Metcalf, Gilbert and Stock, James H.}
}
@article {stock_climate_2020,
	title = {Climate Change, Climate Policy, and Economic Growth},
	journal = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program Discussion Paper Series},
	year = {2020},
	author = {Stock, James H.}
}
@article {sunstein_internalities_2020,
	title = {Internalities, Externalities, and Fuel Economy},
	journal = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program Discussion Paper Series},
	year = {2020},
	abstract = {It is standard to think that corrective taxes, responding to externalities, are generally or always better than regulatory mandates, but in the face of behavioral market failures, that conclusion might not be right. Fuel economy and energy efficiency mandates are possible examples. Because such mandates might produce billions of dollars in annual consumer savings, they might have very high net benefits, complicating the choice between such mandates and externality-correcting taxes (such as carbon taxes). The net benefits of mandates that simultaneously reduce internalities and externalities might exceed the net benefits of taxes that reduce externalities alone, even if mandates turn out to be a highly inefficient way of reducing externalities. An important qualification is that corrective taxes might be designed to reduce both externalities and internalities, in which case they would almost certainly be preferable to a regulatory mandate.},
	author = {Sunstein, Cass R.}
}
@article {aldy_looking_2020,
	title = {Looking Back at Fifty Years of the Clean Air Act},
	journal = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program Discussion Paper Series},
	year = {2020},
	abstract = {Since 1970, transportation, power generation, and manufacturing have dramatically transformed as air pollutant emissions have fallen significantly. To evaluate the causal impacts of the Clean Air Act on these changes, we synthesize and review retrospective analyses of air quality regulations. The geographic heterogeneity in regulatory stringency common to many regulations has important implications for emissions, public health, compliance costs, and employment. Cap-and-trade programs have delivered greater emission reductions at lower cost than conventional regulatory mandates, but policy practice has fallen short of the cost-effective ideal. Implementing regulations in imperfectly competitive markets have also influenced the Clean Air Act{\textquoteright}s benefits and costs.},
	author = {Aldy, Joseph E. and Auffhammer, Maximillian and Cropper, Maureen and Fraas, Arthur and Morgenstern, Richard}
}
@article {stock_data_2020,
	title = {Data Gaps and the Policy Response to the Novel Coronavirus},
	journal = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program Discussion Paper Series},
	year = {2020},
	abstract = {This note lays out the basic Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) epidemiological model of contagion, with a target audience of economists who want a framework for understanding the effects of social distancing and containment policies on the evolution of contagion and interactions with the economy. A key parameter, the asymptomatic rate (the fraction of the infected that are not tested under current guidelines), is not well estimated in the literature because tests for the coronavirus have been targeted at the sick and vulnerable, however it could be estimated by random sampling of the population. In this simple model, different policies that yield the same transmission rate β have the same health outcomes but can have very different economic costs. Thus, one way to frame the economics of shutdown policy is as finding the most efficient policies to achieve a given β, then determining the path of β that trades off the economic cost against the cost of excess lives lost by overwhelming the health care system.},
	author = {Stock, James H.}
}
@article {stavins_future_2019,
	title = {The Future of U.S. Carbon-Pricing Policy},
	journal = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program Discussion Paper},
	year = {2019},
	abstract = {There is widespread agreement among economists {\textendash} and a diverse set of other policy analysts {\textendash} that at least in the long run, an economy-wide carbon pricing system will be an essential element of any national policy that can achieve meaningful reductions of CO2 emissions cost-effectively in the United States. There is less agreement, however, among economists and others in the policy community regarding the choice of specific carbon-pricing policy instrument, with some supporting carbon taxes and others favoring cap-and-trade mechanisms. This prompts two important questions. Which {\textendash} if either {\textendash} of the two major approaches to carbon pricing is superior in terms of relevant criteria, including but not limited to efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and distributional equity? And which of the two approaches is more likely to be adopted in the future in the United States? This paper addresses these questions by drawing on both normative and positive theories of policy instrument choice as they apply to U.S. climate change policy, and draws extensively on relevant empirical evidence. The paper concludes with a look at the path ahead, including an assessment of how the two carbon-pricing instruments can be made more politically acceptable.},
	author = {Stavins, Robert}
}
@booklet {stavins_transitioning_2019,
	title = {Transitioning To Long-Run Effective and Efficient Climate Policies},
	year = {2019},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	author = {Stavins, Robert and Todd Schatzki and Scott, Rebecca}
}
@booklet {noauthor_policy_2018,
	title = {Policy Evolution Under the Clean Air Act},
	number = {DP\_79},
	year = {2018},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	abstract = {The U.S. Clean Air Act, passed in 1970 with strong bipartisan support, was the first environmental law to give the Federal government a serious regulatory role, established the architecture of the U.S. air pollution control system, and became a model for subsequent environmental laws in the United States and globally. We outline the Act{\textquoteright}s key provisions, as well as the main changes Congress has made to it over time. We assess the evolution of air pollution control policy under the Clean Air Act, with particular attention to the types of policy instruments used. We provide a generic assessment of the major types of policy instruments, and we trace and assess the historical evolution of EPA{\textquoteright}s policy instrument use, with particular focus on the increased use of market-based policy instruments, beginning in the 1970s and culminating in the 1990s. Over the past fifty years, air pollution regulation has gradually become much more complex, and over the past twenty years, policy debates have become increasingly partisan and polarized, to the point that it has become impossible to amend the Act or pass other legislation to address the new threat of climate change.},
	author = {Richard, Schmalensee and Stavins, Robert}
}
@booklet {schatzki_key_2018,
	title = {Key Issues Facing California{\textquoteright}s GHG Cap-and-Trade System for 2021-2030},
	number = {DP\_18\_78},
	year = {2018},
	pages = {1{\textendash}31},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, MA},
	abstract = {California{\textquoteright}s Greenhouse Gas (GHG) cap-and-trade program is a key element of the suite of policies the State has adopted to achieve its climate policy goals. The passage of AB 398 (California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006: market-based compliance mechanisms) extended the use of the cap-and-trade program for the 2021-2030 period, while also specifying modifications of the program{\textquoteright}s {\textquotedblleft}cost containment{\textquotedblright} structure and directing CARB to {\textquotedblleft}[e]valuate and address concerns related to overallocation in [ARB{\textquoteright}s] determination of the allowances available for years 2021 to 2030.{\textquotedblright} The changes being considered by CARB will not only affect the program{\textquoteright}s stringency, but also its performance by affecting the ability of the {\textquotedblleft}cost containment{\textquotedblright} structure to mitigate allowance price volatility and the risk of suddenly escalating allowance prices.},
	author = {Todd Schatzki and Stavins, R. N.}
}
@booklet {gerarden_demanding_2018,
	title = {Demanding Innovation: The Impact of Consumer Subsidies on Solar Panel Production Costs},
	number = {DP\_18\_77},
	year = {2018},
	pages = {1{\textendash}62},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, MA},
	abstract = {This paper analyzes the impacts of consumer subsidies in the global market for solar panels. Consumer subsidies can have at least two effects. First, subsidies shift out demand and increase equilibrium quantities, holding production costs fixed. Second, subsidies may encourage firms to innovate to reduce their costs over time. I quantify these impacts by estimating a dynamic structural model of competition among solar panel manufacturers. The model produces two key insights. First, ignoring long-run supply responses can generate biased estimates of the effects of government policy. Without accounting for induced innovation, subsidies increased global solar adoption 49 percent over the period 2010-2015, leading to over \$15 billion in external social benefits. Accounting for induced innovation increases the external benefits by at least 22 percent. Second, decentralized government intervention in a global market is inefficient. A subsidy in one country increases long-run solar adoption elsewhere because it increases investment in innovation by international firms. This spillover underscores the need for international coordination to address climate change.},
	author = {Gerarden, Todd D.}
}
@booklet {chen_slow_2018,
	title = {Slow Focus: Belief Evolution in the U.S. Acid Rain Program},
	number = {DP\_18\_76},
	year = {2018},
	note = {dp_18-76},
	pages = {1{\textendash}49},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, MA},
	abstract = {I study firm behavior in new markets by examining coal-dependent private electric utili-ties{\textquoteright} beliefs about the sulfur dioxide allowance price following the implementation of the U.S. Acid Rain Program. The program is the first large-scale cap-and-trade program, exposing the electric utility industry to a wholly novel market for pollution allowances. I estimate firms{\textquoteright} beliefs about the allowance price from 1995 to 2003 using a firm-level dynamic model of allowance trades, coal quality, and emission reduction investment. I find that firms ini-tially underestimate the role of market fundamentals as a driver of allowance prices, but over time their beliefs appear to converge toward the stochastic process of allowance prices. Such beliefs in the first five years of the program cost firms around 10\% of their profits. Beliefs also change the relative efficiency of cap-and-trade programs and emission taxes.},
	author = {Chen, Cuicui}
}
@article {schmalensee_design_2017,
	title = {The Design of Environmental Markets: What Have We Learned From Experience With Cap and Trade?},
	journal = {Oxford Review of Economic Policy},
	volume = {33},
	number = {4},
	year = {2017},
	note = {A-89},
	pages = {572{\textendash}588},
	abstract = {Abstract: This article reviews the design of environmental markets for pollution control over the past 30 years, and identifies key market-design lessons for future applications. The focus is on a subset of the cap-and-trade systems that have been implemented, planned, or proposed around the world. Three criteria led us to the selection of systems for review. First, among the broader class of tradable permit systems, our focus is exclusively on cap-and-trade mechanisms, thereby excluding emission-reductioncredit or offset programmes. Second, among cap-and-trade mechanisms, we examine only those that target pollution abatement, and so we do not include applications to natural resource management, such as individual transferable quota systems used to regulate fisheries. Third, we focus on the most prominent applications{\textemdash}those that are particularly important environmentally, economically, or both. Keywords: environmental markets, cap-and-trade system, air pollution, global climate change JEL classification: Q58, Q28, Q53, Q54},
	author = {Schmalensee, Richard and Stavins, Robert N.}
}
@booklet {coglianese_effects_2017,
	title = {The Effects of Fuel Prices, Regulations, and Other Factors on U.S. Coal Production, 2008-2016},
	number = {17-90},
	year = {2017},
	publisher = {Harvard Project on Climate Agreements},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	author = {Coglianese, John and Gerarden, Todd D. and Stock, James}
}
@booklet {greenstone_next_2017,
	title = {The Next Generation of Transportation Policy},
	number = {17-75},
	year = {2017},
	publisher = {Harvard Project on Climate Agreements},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	abstract = {Motor vehicle fuel-economy standards have long been a cornerstone of U.S. policy to reduce fuel consumption in the light-duty vehicle fleet. In 2011 and 2012 these standards were significantly expanded in an effort to achieve steep reductions in oil demand and greenhouse gas emissions through 2025, consistent with long-term U.S. policy goals. As a policy approach, however, standards that focus on efficiency alone, as opposed to lifetime consumption, impose unnecessarily high costs and do not deliver guaranteed petroleum savings. On the basis of a commitment to cost-benefit analysis, defining U.S. regulatory policy for more than 30 years, we propose a novel policy solution that would implement a cap-and-trade system in transportation. Acknowledging that the very idea of cap and trade has become controversial, we show that this approach would increase the certainty of reductions in fuel consumption in transportation and do so at a far lower cost per gallon avoided. Such an approach is consistent with the regulatory authority existing at key federal agencies.},
	author = {Greenstone, Michael and Sunstein, Cass R. and Ori, Sam}
}
@booklet {baker_subsidies_2017,
	title = {Subsidies for Succulents: Evaluating the Las Vegas Cash-for-Grass Rebate Program},
	number = {17-74},
	year = {2017},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	abstract = {I estimate the water savings and property value effects of a Las Vegas area water conservation program that subsidizes conversions of lawn to desert landscape. Using event studies and panel fixed-effects models, I find that the average conversion reduces baseline water consumption by 21 percent and increases property values by about 1 percent. In addition, my results show that water savings remain relatively stable over time; that water savings are inversely proportional to annual program take-up; that participants with high pre-conversion water demand save more water than participants with lower pre-conversion water demand; and that a 6 percent price increase would have achieved equivalent savings. I find little evidence of property value spillovers to neighboring properties. The program saves water at an annual rate of \$4.84/kgal and if I include an estimate of the scarcity value of water, generates net benefits of \$2.00 per square foot of desert landscape converted.},
	author = {Baker, Jonathan}
}
@booklet {park_will_2017,
	title = {Will We Adapt? Labor Productivity and Adaptation to Climate Change},
	number = {17-73},
	year = {2017},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	abstract = {
	This study explores the for labor-related production impacts of temperature stress both for its own interest and to understand the scope for adaptation to climate change. Focusing on non-agricultural output, I find that hot temperature exerts a significant causal impact on local labor product, with substantially larger effects in highly ex-posed industries such as construction, manufacturing, and transportation. Places that experience more extreme heat exposure in expectation (e.g. Houston, Orlando) exhibit lower impacts per hot day than cooler regions (e.g. Boston, San Francisco). A year with 10 additional 90{\textdegree}F days would reduce output per capita in highly exposed sectors by -3.5\% in counties in the coldest quintile and -1.3\%, roughly a third, in the warmest quintile. County-level air-conditioning penetration explains a large proportion of these differences. While these estimates suggest adaptation to heat stress in the long-run, they also imply realistic limits, at least given current technologies.

},
	author = {Park, Jisung}
}
@booklet {weitzman_world_2016,
	title = {On a World Climate Assembly and the Social Cost of Carbon},
	number = {16-72},
	year = {2016},
	note = {Weitzman{\textquoteright}s research builds on his previous paper released by the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, "Voting on Prices vs. Voting on Quantities in a World Climate Assembly" (June 2015).},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	abstract = {This paper postulates the conceptually useful allegory of a futuristic "World Climate Assembly" (WCA) that votes for a single worldwide price on carbon emissions via the basic democratic principle of one-person one-vote majority rule. If this WCA framework can be accepted in the first place, then voting on a single internationally-binding minimum carbon price (the proceeds from which are domestically retained) tends to counter self-interest by incentivizing countries or agents to internalize the externality. I attempt to sketch out the sense in which each WCA-agent{\textquoteright}s extra cost from a higher emissions price is counter-balanced by that agent{\textquoteright}s extra benefit from inducing all other WCA-agents to simultaneously lower their emissions in response to the higher price. The first proposition of this paper derives a relatively simple formula relating each emitter{\textquoteright}s single-peaked most-preferred world price of carbon emissions to the world "Social Cost of Carbon" (SCC). The second and third propositions relate the WCA-voted world price of carbon to the world SCC. I argue that the WCA-voted price and the SCC are unlikely to differ sharply. Some implications are discussed. The overall methodology of the paper is a mixture of mostly classical with some behavioral economics.},
	author = {Weitzman, Martin L.}
}
@booklet {haefele_total_2016,
	title = {Total Economic Valuation of the National Park Service Lands and Programs: Results of a Survey of the American Public},
	number = {16-71},
	year = {2016},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	author = {Haefele, Michelle and Loomis, John and Bilmes, Linda J.}
}
@booklet {sullivan_true_2016,
	title = {The True Cost of Air Pollution: Evidence from House Prices and Migration},
	number = {16-69},
	year = {2016},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	abstract = {In this paper, I present evidence that current economics research significantly underestimates the effects of air pollution, regardless of the outcome of interest. This bias exists even in quasi-experimental estimates and arises from the way researchers define individual-level pollution exposure. A polluter{\textquoteright}s effect on nearby residents changes dramatically with the direction of the wind, and most popular methods, including geographic diff-in-diffs and monitor-based interpolations, are unable to account for such sharp changes in exposure over short distances. To solve this problem, I use an atmospheric dispersion model, which explicitly accounts for meteorological conditions, to determine the effect of every polluting firm on every house in greater Los Angeles. I then estimate the effect of NOx emissions on house prices and neighborhood composition using the exogenous variation in emissions caused by the California Electricity Crisis of 2000 and a cap-and-trade program in greater Los Angeles. The estimated price response is much larger than past estimates and implies that the social value of the cap-and-trade program is roughly \$502 million per year, 15 times larger than the associated abatement costs. However, when based on conventional measures of pollution exposure, this estimated valuation is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The estimated neighborhood sorting response suggests that, despite the high aggregate value, low-income households may not have benefited much from the improvement in air quality.},
	author = {Sullivan, Daniel M.}
}
@booklet {stolper_who_2016,
	title = {Who Bears the Burden of Energy Taxes? The Critical Role of Pass-Through},
	number = {16-70},
	year = {2016},
	month = {may},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	abstract = {Existing estimates of energy tax incidence assume that the pass-through of taxes to final consumer prices is uniform across the affected population. I show that, in fact, variation in local market conditions drives significant heterogeneity in pass-through, and ignoring this can lead to mistaken conclusions about the distributional impacts of energy taxes. I use data from the Spanish retail automotive fuel market to estimate station-specific pass-through, focusing on the effects of competition and wealth. A novel informational mandate provides access to a national, station-daily panel of retail diesel prices and characteristics and allows me to investigate market composition at a fine level. Event study and difference-in-differences regression reveal that, while retail prices rise nearly one-for-one (100\%) with taxes on average, station-specific pass-through rates range from at least 70\% to 115\%. Greater market power {\textendash} measured by brand concentration and spatial isolation {\textendash} is strongly associated with higher pass-through, even after conditioning on detailed demand-side characteristics. Furthermore, pass-through rises monotonically in area-average house prices. While a conventional estimate of the Spanish diesel tax burden suggests roughly equivalent incidence across the wealth distribution, overlaying the effect of heterogeneous pass-through reveals the tax to be unambiguously progressive.},
	author = {Stolper, Samuel}
}
@booklet {chen_collective_2016,
	title = {Collective Action in an Asymmetric World},
	number = {16-68},
	year = {2016},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	abstract = {A central authority possessing tax and expenditure responsibilities can readily provide an efficient level of a public good. Absent a central authority, the case with climate change mitigation, voluntary arrangements must replace coercive arrangements; significant under-provision must be expected. Potential contributors have strong incentives to free ride, or to ride cheaply. International public goods are particularly challenging. The players - the nations of the world - are many and they start in quite different circumstances. Voluntary arrangements that might emerge from negotiations fall short for two reasons: First, players frame negotiations from their own standpoint, making stalemate likely. Second, the focal-point solution where contributions are proportional to benefits clashes with the disproportionate incentives little players have to ride cheaply. We identify a solution, the Cheap- Riding Efficient Equilibrium, which defines the relative contributions of players of differing size (or preference intensity) to reflect cheap riding incentives, yet still achieves Pareto optimality. Players start by establishing the Alliance/Nash Equilibrium as a base point. From that point they apply either the principles of the Lindahl Equilibrium or the Nash Bargaining Solution to proceed to the Pareto frontier. The former benefits from its focal-point properties; the latter is a standard analytic tool addressing bargaining. We apply our theory to climate change by first examining the Nordhaus Climate Club proposal. We then test the Alliance Equilibrium model using individual nations{\textquoteright} Intended Nationally Determined Contributions pledged at the Paris Climate Change Conference. As hypothesized, larger nations made much larger pledges in proportion to their Gross National Incomes.},
	author = {Chen, Cuicui and Zeckhauser, Richard}
}
@booklet {dupont_green_2016,
	title = {Green Bonds and Land Conservation: The Evolution of a New Financing Tool},
	year = {2016},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	abstract = {"Green Bonds" emerged as a new form of environmental financing in 2007. While most investors still view them as a niche product in the overall fixed income market, green bonds have grown rapidly to nearly \$37 billion in issuance in 2014, with issuers from the World Bank to the State of Massachusetts. This paper examines the current and potential future use of green bonds for financing sustainable land use and conservation projects around the world. The paper draws on interviews with land conservation practitioners, bond issuers, investors, and financial analysts, as well as analysis of two case studies in China and Massachusetts. The paper summarizes the key insights from this community of experts, and lays out a series of steps that will be required before green bonds can develop into a significant and reliable tool in the conservation finance toolkit. The authors find that projects linked to water and stormwater management may be investment {\textquotedblleft}sweet spots{\textquotedblright} for green bonds and land conservation.},
	author = {duPont, Carolyn M. and Levitt, James N. and Bilmes, Linda J.}
}
@booklet {schmalensee_lessons_2015,
	title = {Lessons Learned from Three Decades of Experience with Cap-and-Trade},
	year = {2015},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	abstract = {This essay provides an overview of the major emissions trading programs of the past thirty years on which significant documentation exists, and draws a number of important lessons for future applications of this environmental policy instrument. References to a larger number of other emissions trading programs that have been implemented or proposed are included.},
	author = {Schmalensee, Richard and Stavins, Robert N.}
}
@booklet {weitzman_internationally-tradable_2015,
	title = {Internationally-Tradable Permits Can Be Riskier for a Country than an Internally-Imposed Carbon Price},
	year = {2015},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	abstract = {This paper compares internationally-tradeable permits with a uniform carbon price, as seen through the lens of an individual country. To ensure a level playing field, these two approaches are initially calibrated to be welfare-equivalent for the country in a deterministic setting. While both price and quantity instruments have identical consequences under perfect certainty, outcomes differ substantially when uncertainty is introduced. The uncertainty analyzed here takes the reduced form of idiosyncratic country-specific abatement-cost shocks. Then, because of cross-border revenue flows, internationally-tradable permits can expose a country to greater risk than the imposition of a uniform carbon price (whose revenue proceeds are domestically retained). This result is formalized in a very simple model that highlights the core essence of the argument. Some implications are discussed. I suggest that this relative-riskiness result may be a pertinent consideration in choosing between negotiated price-based approaches and negotiated quantity-based approaches for controlling worldwide carbon emissions.},
	author = {Weitzman, Martin L}
}
@booklet {henderson_making_2015,
	title = {Making the Business Case for Environmental Sustainability},
	year = {2015},
	month = {08/00},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	author = {Henderson, Rebecca}
}
@booklet {bhanot_rank_2015,
	title = {Rank and Response: A Field Experiment on Peer Information and Water Use Behavior},
	year = {2015},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	abstract = {Perception of social rank, or how we perform relative to our peers, can be a powerful motivator. While research exists on the effect of social information on decision making, there is less work on how ranked comparisons with our peers influence our behavior. This paper outlines a field experiment conducted with 5,180 households in Castro Valley, California, which used household mailers with various forms of peer information and social rank messaging to motivate water conservation. The experiment tests the effect of a visible social rank on water use, and how the cooperative and competitive framing of rank information influences behavioral response. Difference-in-difference and matching methods reveal sizable treatment effects of the mailers on household water use (reductions of 13-17 gallons per day, depending on mailer version). However, households with relatively low or high water use in the pre-treatment period responded differently to information framing. We find that neutrally-framed rank information caused a "boomerang effect" (i.e., an increase in average water use) for low water use households, but this effect was eliminated by competitive framing. At the same time, competitively-framed rank information demotivated high water use households, increasing their average water use further. This result is supported by evidence that the competitive frame on rank information increased water use for households who ranked "last" in the peer group - a detrimental "last place effect" from competitive framing.},
	author = {Bhanot, Syon}
}
@booklet {metcalf_role_2015,
	title = {The Role of Integrated Assessment Models in Climate Policy: A User{\textquoteright}s Guide and Assessment},
	year = {2015},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	abstract = {This paper considers the role of integrated assessment models (IAMs) in the construction of climate policy. We focus on questions involving the role of IAMs in estimating the social cost of carbon (SCC), how best to handle the considerable scientific uncertainty underlying the IAMs from the perspective of estimating the SCC, and whether an IAM-based SCC should be abandoned and replaced by expert judgment or another substitute. The perspective we adopt in tackling these questions is rooted in the specific needs of the existing U.S. institutions responsible for making and implementing climate policy, specifically regulatory agencies within the Executive Branch and Congress should it choose to take up climate legislation. Our discussion has three premises. First, policy makers need a numerical value and an uncertainty range for the SCC for policy evaluation and implementation. Second, whatever the true value of the SCC is, it is not zero. Third, considerable uncertainty surrounds the current state of scientific knowledge about the current and future costs of climate change. The evolving nature of the science and the ultimate goal of informing first-best policy suggests to us that the official SCC {\textendash} the SCC used for regulatory analysis by the U.S. Government {\textendash} should not be thought of as a single number or even a range of numbers, but more broadly as a process that yields updated estimates of those numbers and ranges. Viewed in this way, the ultimate goal of the process is scientific credibility, public acceptance, and political and legal viability.},
	author = {Metcalf, Gilbert and Stock, James H.}
}
@booklet {coglianese_anticipation_2015,
	title = {Anticipation, Tax Avoidance, and the Price Elasticity of Gasoline Demand},
	year = {2015},
	month = {07/00},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	abstract = {Traditional least squares estimates of the responsiveness of gasoline consumption to changes in gasoline prices are biased toward zero, given the endogeneity of gasoline prices. A seemingly natural solution to this problem is to instrument for gasoline prices using gasoline taxes, but this approach tends to yield implausibly large price elasticities. We demonstrate that anticipatory behavior provides an important explanation for this result. We provide evidence that gasoline buyers increase gasoline purchases before tax increases and delay gasoline purchases before tax decreases. This intertemporal substitution renders the tax instrument endogenous, invalidating conventional IV analysis. We show that including suitable leads and lags in the regression restores the validity of the IV estimator, resulting in much lower and more plausible elasticity estimates. Our analysis has implications more broadly for the IV analysis of markets in which buyers may store purchases for future consumption.},
	author = {Coglianese, John and Davis, Lucas W. and Kilian, Lutz and Stock, James H.}
}
@booklet {gerarden_assessing_2015,
	title = {Assessing the Energy-Efficiency Gap},
	year = {2015},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Energy-efficient technologies offer considerable promise for reducing the financial costs and environmental damages associated with energy use, but these technologies appear not to be adopted by consumers and businesses to the degree that would apparently be justified, even on a purely financial basis. We present two complementary frameworks for understanding this so-called {\textquotedblleft}energy paradox{\textquotedblright} or {\textquotedblleft}energy-efficiency gap.{\textquotedblright} First, we build on the previous literature by dividing potential explanations for the energy-efficiency gap into three categories: market failures, behavioral anomalies, and model and measurement errors. Second, we posit that it is useful to think in terms of the fundamental elements of cost-minimizing energy-efficiency decisions. This provides a decomposition that organizes thinking around four questions. First, are product offerings and pricing economically efficient? Second, are energy operating costs inefficiently priced and/or understood? Third, are product choices cost-minimizing in present value terms? Fourth, do other costs inhibit more energy-efficient decisions? We review empirical evidence on these questions, with an emphasis on recent advances, and offer suggestions for future research.},
	author = {Gerarden, Todd D. and Newell, Richard G. and Stavins, Robert N.}
}
@booklet {duflo_value_2015,
	title = {The Value of Regulatory Discretion: Estimates from Environmental Inspections in India},
	year = {2015},
	publisher = {Harvard Project on Climate Agreements},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {In collaboration with a state environmental regulator in India, we conducted a field experiment to raise the frequency of environmental inspections to the prescribed minimum for a random set of industrial plants. The treatment was successful when judged by process measures, as treatment plants, relative to the control group, were more than twice as likely to be inspected and to be cited for violating pollution standards. Yet the treatment was weaker for more consequential outcomes: the regulator was no more likely to identify extreme polluters (i.e., plants with emissions five times the regulatory standard or more) or to impose costly penalties in the treatment group. In response to the added scrutiny, treatment plants only marginally increased compliance with standards and did not significantly reduce mean pollution emissions. To explain these results and recover the full costs of environmental regulation,we model the regulatory process as a dynamic discrete game where the regulator chooses whether to penalize and plants choose whether to abate to avoid future sanctions. We estimate this model using original data on 10,000 interactions between plants and the regulator. Our estimates imply that the costs of environmental regulation are largely reserved for extremely polluting plants. Applying the cost estimates to the experimental data, we find the average treatment inspection imposes about half the cost on plants that the average control inspection does, because the randomly assigned inspections in the treatment are less likely than normal discretionary inspections to target such extreme polluters.},
	author = {Duflo, Esther and Greenstone, Michael and Rohini Pande and Ryan, Nicholas}
}
@booklet {houde_belt_2014,
	title = {Belt and Suspenders and More: The Incremental Impact of Energy Efficiency Subsidies in the Presence of Existing Policy Instruments},
	year = {2014},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {The effectiveness of investment subsidies depends on the existing array of regulatory and information mandates, especially in the energy efficiency space. Some consumers respond to information disclosure by purchasing energy-efficient durables (and thus may increase the inframarginal take-up of a subsequent subsidy), while other consumers may locate at the lower bound of a minimum efficiency standard (and a given subsidy may be insufficient to change their investment toward a more energy-efficient option). We investigate the incremental impact of energy efficiency rebates in the context of regulatory and information mandates by evaluating the State Energy Efficient Appliance Rebate Program (SEEARP) implemented through the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The design of the program {\textendash} Federal funds allocated to states on a per capita basis with significant discretion in state program design and implementation {\textendash} facilitates our empirical analysis. Using transaction-level data on appliance sales, we show that most program participants were inframarginal due to important short-term intertemporal substitutions where consumers delayed their purchases by a few weeks. We find evidence that some consumers accelerated the replacement of their old appliances by a few years, but overall the impact of the program on ong-term energy demand is likely to be very small. Our estimated measures of cost-effectiveness are an order of magnitude higher than estimated for other energy efficiency programs in the literature. We also show that designing subsidies that reflect, in part, underlying attribute-based regulatory mandates can result in perverse effects, such as upgrading to larger, less energy-efficient models.},
	author = {Houde, Sebastien and Aldy, Joseph E.}
}
@booklet {frankel_national_2014,
	title = {National Security and Domestic Oil Depletion},
	year = {2014},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {American politicians often take it for granted that national security would be enhanced by accelerating domestic oil production, through policies such as subsidies, tax advantages, opening up federal lands for drilling at artificially low charges, and relaxing environmental regulation. This note argues that such policies actually hurt national security in the long term, by depleting domestic reserves. It proposes saving some of the deposits located offshore and under shale beds for a future emergency, by withholding federal permits for now, by reversing current artificial subsidies to production, and by a tax to encourage conservation.},
	author = {Frankel, Jeffrey}
}
@booklet {aldy_labor_2014,
	title = {The Labor Market Impacts of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Oil Drilling Moratorium},
	year = {2014},
	month = {aug},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {In 2010, the Gulf Coast experienced the largest oil spill, the greatest mobilization of spill response resources, and the first Gulf-wide deepwater drilling moratorium in U.S. history. Taking advantage of the unexpected nature of the spill and drilling moratorium, I estimate the net effects of these events on Gulf Coast employment and wages. Despite predictions of major job losses in Louisiana {\textendash} resulting from the spill and the drilling moratorium {\textendash} I find that Louisiana coastal parishes, and oil-intensive parishes in particular, experienced a net increase in employment and wages. In contrast, Gulf Coast Florida counties, especially those south of the Panhandle, experienced a decline in employment. Analysis of accommodation industry employment and wage, business establishment count, sales tax, and commercial air arrival data likewise show positive economic activity impacts in the oil-intensive coastal parishes of Louisiana and reduced economic activity along the Non-Panhandle Florida Gulf Coast.},
	author = {Aldy, Joseph E.}
}
@booklet {glaeser_supply_2014,
	title = {The Supply of Environmentalism},
	year = {2014},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Long before economics turned to psychology, environmentalists were nudging and framing and pushing their cause like highly gifted amateur psychologists. Their interventions seem to have changed behavior by altering beliefs, norms and preferences, but because psychological interventions are often coarse, inadvertent, offsetting side effects occur. After discussing the interplay between environmental preference-making and economics, I turn to three areas where strong, simple views have spread{\textemdash}electric cars, recycling and local conservation efforts. In all three areas, environmental rules of thumb can lead to significant, adverse environmental side effects. Local environmentalism, for example, may increase carbon emissions by pushing development from low emission areas, like coastal California, to high emissions areas elsewhere. I end by discussing how economic analysis of the political market for ideas can make sense of the remarkable disparity of views on global warming.},
	author = {Edward L. Glaeser}
}
@booklet {martin_averting_2014,
	title = {Averting Catastrophes: The Strange Economics of Scylla and Charybdis},
	year = {2014},
	month = {jun},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {How should we evaluate public policies or projects to avert, or reduce the likeli- hood of, a catastrophic event? Examples might include inspection and surveillance programs to avert nuclear terrorism, investments in vaccine technologies to help respond to a {\textbackslash}mega- virus," or the construction of levees to avert major ooding. A policy to avert a particular catastrophe considered in isolation might be evaluated in a cost-benet framework. But be- cause society faces multiple potential catastrophes, simple cost-benet analysis breaks down: Even if the benet of averting each one exceeds the cost, we should not necessarily avert all of them. We explore the policy interdependence of catastrophic events, and show that con- sidering these events in isolation can lead to policies that are far from optimal. We develop a rule for determining which events should be averted and which should not.},
	author = {Martin, Ian W.R. and Pindyck, Robert S.}
}
@booklet {covert_experiential_2014,
	title = {Experiential and Social Learning in Firms: The Case of Hydraulic Fracturing in the Bakken Shale},
	year = {2014},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Learning how to utilize new technologies is a key step in innovation, yet little is known about how firms actually learn. This paper examines firms{\textquoteright} learning behavior using data on their operational choices, profits, and information sets. I study companies using hydraulic fracturing in North Dakota{\textquoteright}s Bakken Shale formation, where firms must learn the relationship between fracking input use and oil production. Using a new dataset that covers every well since the introduction of fracking to this forma- tion, I find that firms made more profitable input choices over time, but did so slowly and incompletely, only capturing 67\% of possible profits from fracking at the end of 2011. To understand what factors may have limited learning, I estimate a model of fracking input use in the presence of technology un- certainty. Firms are more likely to make fracking input choices with higher expected profits and lower standard deviation of profits, consistent with passive learning but not active experimentation. Most firms over-weight their own information relative to observable information generated by others. These results suggest the existence of economically important frictions in the learning process.},
	author = {Covert, Thomas R.}
}
@booklet {heal_feeling_2014,
	title = {Feeling the Heat: Temperature, Physiology \&amp; the Wealth of Nations},
	year = {2014},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Does temperature affect economic performance? Has temperature always affected social welfare through its impact on physical and cognitive function? While many studies have explored the indirect links between climate and welfare (e.g. agricultural yield, violent conflict, or sea-level rise), few address the possibility of direct impacts operating through human physiology. This paper presents a model of labor supply under thermal stress, building on a longstanding physiological literature linking thermal stress to health and task performance. A key prediction is that effective labor supply {\textendash} defined as a composite of labor hours, task performance, and effort {\textendash} is decreasing in temperature deviations from the biological optimum. We use country-level panel data on population-weighted average temperature and income (1950-2005), to illustrate the potential magnitude of the effect. Using a fixed effects estimation strategy, we find that hotter-than-average years are associated with lower output per capita for already hot countries and higher output per capita for cold countries: approximately 3\%-4\% in both directions. We then use household data on air conditioning and heating expenditures from the {US} to provide further evidence in support of a physiologically based causal mechanism. This more direct causal link between climate and social welfare has important implications for both the economics of climate change and comparative development.},
	author = {Heal, Geoffrey M. and Park, Jisung}
}
@booklet {aldy_heterogeneity_2014,
	title = {Heterogeneity in the Value of Life},
	year = {2014},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {We develop a numerical life-cycle model with choice over consumption and leisure, stochastic mortalityand labor income processes, and calibrated to U.S. data to characterize willingness to pay ({WTP})for mortality risk reduction. Our theoretical framework can explain many empirical findings in thisliterature, including an inverted-U life-cycle {WTP} and an order of magnitude difference in prime-aged adults {WTP}. By endogenizing leisure and employing multiple income measures, we reconcilethe literature{\textquoteright}s large variation in estimated income elasticities. By accounting for gender- and race-specific stochastic mortality and income processes, we explain the literature{\textquoteright}s black-white and female-male differences.},
	author = {Aldy, Joseph E. and Smyth, Seamus J.}
}
@booklet {allcott_information_2014,
	title = {Information Disclosure through Agents: Evidence from a Field Experiment},
	year = {2014},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {With a large nationwide retailer, we run a natural field experiment to measure the effects of energy use information disclosure, rebates, and sales agent incentives on demand for energy efficient durable goods. Sales incentives and rebates are complementary, but information and sales incentives alone have statistically and economically insignificant effects. Sales agents comply only partially with the experiment, targeting information at the most interested consumers but not discussing energy efficiency with the disinterested majority. In follow-up surveys, most consumers are aware of the energy efficient model and may even overestimate its benefits, suggesting that imperfect information is not a major barrier to adoption in this context.},
	author = {Allcott, Hunt and Sweeney, Richard}
}
@booklet {seo_can_2013,
	title = {Can Behavioral Biases Explain Demand for a Harmful Pesticide? Evidence from India},
	year = {2013},
	month = {may},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Millions of cotton farmers in India use Monocrotophos, a pesticide that is both toxic{\textemdash}the level of exposure found in the field is linked to irreversible cognitive impairment, depression and suicidal tendencies{\textemdash}and inferior in efficacy to other safer, similar cost alternatives. I use three experiments to test whether misperception and inferential challenges created by a habit of mixing different inputs together explain why farmers fail to abandon Monocrotophos. I conduct a brief information campaign that reduces farmers{\textquoteright} self-reported plans to purchase the pesticide for the next planting season by 37\%. I show how the campaign addresses behavioral biases. I discuss implications for public health policy interventions and general lessons for thinking about mechanisms for technology selection in markets where {\textquotedblleft}unlearning{\textquotedblright} specious product benefits may be difficult due to psychological and behavioral stumbling blocks.},
	author = {Seo, Hee Kwon}
}
@booklet {kopczuk_laws_2013,
	title = {Do the Laws of Tax Incidence Hold? Point of Collection and the Pass-through of State Diesel Taxes},
	year = {2013},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {The canonical theory of taxation holds that the incidence of a tax is independent of the side of the market which is responsible for remitting the tax to the government. However, this prediction does not survive in certain circumstances, for example when the ability to evade taxes differs across economic agents. In this paper, we estimate in the context of state diesel fuel taxes how the incidence of a quantity tax depends on the point of tax collection, where the level of the supply chain responsible for remitting the tax varies across states and over time. Our results indicate that moving the point of tax collection from the retail station to higher in the supply chain substantially raises the pass-through of diesel taxes to the retail price. Furthermore, tax revenues respond positively to collecting taxes from the distributor or prime supplier rather than from the retailer, suggesting that evasion is the likely explanation for the incidence result.},
	author = {Kopczuk, Wojciech and Marion, Justin and Muehlegger, Erich and Slemrod, Joel}
}
@booklet {talbott_lighting_2013,
	title = {Lighting the Way: Unlocking Performance Gains in Electricity Distribution and Retailing in India},
	year = {2013},
	month = {may},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	author = {Talbott, Will}
}
@booklet {drake_sustainable_2013,
	title = {Sustainable Operations Management: An enduring stream or a passing fancy?},
	year = {2013},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Paul Kleindorfer was among the first to weigh in on and nurture the stream of Sustainable Operations Management. The thoughts laid out here are based on conversations we had with Paul relating to the drivers underlying sustainability as a management issue: population and per capita consumption growth, the limited nature of resources and sinks, and the responsibility and exposure of firms to ensuing ecological risks and costs. We then discuss how an operations management lens contributes to the issue, and criteria to help the Sustainable Operations Management perspective endure. This article relates to a presentation delivered by Morris Cohen for Paul{\textquoteright}s Manufacturing and Service Operations Management Distinguished Fellows Award, given at Columbia University, June 18, 2012. We wrote this article at Paul{\textquoteright}s request.},
	author = {Drake, David F. and Spinler, Stefan}
}
@booklet {weitzman_voting_2013,
	title = {A Voting Architecture for the Governance of Free-Driver Externalities, with Application to Geoengineering},
	year = {2013},
	month = {may},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Climate change is a global "free rider" problem because significant abatement of greenhouse gases is an expensive public good requiring international cooperation to apportion compliance among states. But it is also a global "free driver" problem because geoengineering the stratosphere with reflective particles to block incoming solar radiation is so cheap that it could essentially be undertaken unilaterally by one state perceiving itself to be in peril. This paper develops the main features of a "free driver" externality in a simple model based on the asymmetric consequences of type-I and type-{II} errors. I propose a social-choice decision architecture embodying the solution concept of a supermajority voting rule and derive its basic properties. In the model this supermajority voting rule attains the socially optimal cooperative solution, which is a new theoretical result around which the paper is built.},
	author = {Weitzman, Martin}
}
@booklet {herrnstadt_weather_2013,
	title = {Weather, Salience of Climate Change and Congressional Voting},
	year = {2013},
	month = {jun},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Climate change is a complex long-run phenomenon. The speed and severity with which it is occurring is difficult to observe, complicating the formation of beliefs for individuals. We use Google Insights search intensity data as a proxy for the salience of climate change and examine how search patterns vary with unusual local weather. We find that searches for "climate change" and "global warming" increase with extreme temperatures and unusual lack of snow. The responsiveness to weather shocks is greater in states that are more reliant on climate-sensitive industries and that elect more environmentally-favorable congressional delegations. Furthermore, we demonstrate that effects of abnormal weather extend beyond search behavior to observable action on environmental issues. We examine the voting records of members of the U.S. Congress from 2004 to 2011 and find that members are more likely to take a pro-environment stance on votes when their home-state experiences unusual weather.},
	author = {Herrnstadt, Evan and Muehlegger, Erich}
}
@booklet {cicala_when_2013,
	title = {When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel Procurement in U.S. Electricity Generation},
	year = {2013},
	month = {may},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Under what conditions does cost-of-service regulation lead firms to distort costs? This paper analyzes changes in fuel procurement practices by coal- and natural gas-fired electricity generating plants in the United States following state-level legislation that ended cost-of-service regulation among investor-owned electric utilities in the late 1990s. I construct a detailed dataset that links confidential, shipment-level data on the price of virtually all of the fuel delivered to coal- and gas-fired electricity plants in the United States from 1990-2009, with plant-level data on operations and regulatory status. Using a matched difference-in-difference estimation strategy to account for confounding shipping costs, I found the price of coal drops by 12\% at deregulated plants relative to matched plants that were not subject to any regulatory change, whereas there was no relative drop in the price of gas. Deregulated plants disproportionately switch to burning low-sulfur coal rather than install capital-intensive abatement equipment to comply with environmental regulations, and expand imports from out of state by 25\% if they were initially burning in-state coal. I show how these results lend support to theories of asymmetric information between generators and regulators, regulatory capture, and capital-bias as important sources of distortion under cost-of-service regulation. I then show that the drop in the price of coal is associated with a reallocation of purchases to more productive mines, rather than simply a transfer of regulatory rents from coal producers to electricity generators. Although only one quarter of U.S. coal-fired capacity has been deregulated, the end of cost-of-service regulation has reduced the price of fuel by about one billion dollars per year for these plants.},
	author = {Cicala, Steve}
}
@booklet {marquis_when_2012,
	title = {When Do Firms Greenwash? Corporate Visibility, Civil Society Scrutiny, and Environmental Disclosure},
	year = {2012},
	month = {dec},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Under increased pressure to report environmental impacts, some firms selectively disclose relatively benign impacts, creating an impression of transparency while masking their true performance. What deters selective disclosure and leads firms to instead make disclosures more representative of their environmental performance? We hypothesize that selective disclosure, a novel symbolic strategy firms use to manage stakeholder perceptions, is mitigated by two forms of organizational visibility. Firms with greater domain-specific visibility have specific characteristics that make them especially vulnerable to stakeholder criticism and as a result are less prone to selective disclosure. In contrast, more generically-visible firms are deterred from selectively disclosing only when they are subjected to civil society scrutiny. We test our hypotheses using a novel panel dataset of 4,484 public companies in many industries, headquartered in 38 countries, during 2005-2008, when environmental disclosure increased among global corporations. We find that domain-specific visibility mitigates selective disclosure, that it mitigates selective disclosure more so than generic visibility, and that generic visibility mitigates selective disclosure only in the presence of civil society scrutiny. This research contributes to understanding how corporations manage the symbolic use of information and how corporate behavior is influenced by civil society scrutiny embedded in institutional processes.},
	author = {Marquis, Christopher and Toffel, Michael W.}
}
@booklet {simcoe_public_2012,
	title = {Public Procurement and the Private Supply of Green Buildings},
	year = {2012},
	month = {dec},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {We measure the impact of municipal policies requiring governments to construct green buildings on private-sector adoption of the U.S. Green Building Council{\textquoteright}s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design ({LEED}) standard. Using matching methods, panel data, and instrumental variables, we find that government procurement rules produce spillover effects that stimulate both private-sector adoption of the {LEED} standard and supplier investments in green building expertise. Our findings suggest that government procurement policies can accelerate the diffusion of new environmental standards that require coordinated complementary investments by various types of private adopters.},
	author = {Simcoe, Timothy and Toffel, Michael W.}
}
@booklet {duflo_up_2012,
	title = {Up in Smoke: The Influence of Household Behavior on the Long-Run Impact of Improved Cooking Stoves},
	year = {2012},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {It is conventional wisdom that it is possible to reduce exposure to indoor air pollution, improve health outcomes, and decrease greenhouse gas emissions in the rural areas of developing countries through the adoption of improved cooking stoves. This belief is largely supported by observational field studies and engineering or laboratory experiments. However, we provide new evidence, from a randomized control trial conducted in rural Orissa, India (one of the poorest places in India), on the benefits of a commonly used improved stove that laboratory tests showed to reduce indoor air pollution and require less fuel. We track households for up to four years after they received the stove. While we find a meaningful reduction in smoke inhalation in the first year, there is no effect over longer time horizons. We find no evidence of improvements in lung functioning or health and there is no change in fuel consumption (and presumably greenhouse gas emissions). The difference between the laboratory and field findings appear to result from households{\textquoteright} revealed low valuation of the stoves. Households failed to use the stoves regularly or appropriately, did not make the necessary investments to maintain them properly, and usage rates ultimately declined further over time. More broadly, this study underscores the need to test environmental and health technologies in real-world settings where behavior may temper impacts, and to test them over a long enough horizon to understand how this behavioral effect evolves over time.},
	author = {Duflo, Esther and Greenstone, Michael and Hanna, Rema}
}
@booklet {greenstone_environmental_2012,
	title = {Environmental Regulations, Air and Water Pollution, and Infant Mortality in India},
	year = {2012},
	month = {sep},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Using the most comprehensive data file ever compiled on air pollution, water pollution, environmental regulations, and infant mortality from a developing country, the paper examines the effectiveness of India{\textquoteright}s environmental regulations. The air pollution regulations were effective at reducing ambient concentrations of particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen dioxide. The most successful air pollution regulation is associated with a modest and statistically insignificant decline in infant mortality. However, the water pollution regulations had no observable effect. Overall, these results contradict the conventional wisdom that environmental quality is a deterministic function of income and underscore the role of institutions and politics.},
	author = {Greenstone, Michael and Hanna, Rema}
}
@booklet {hornbeck_historically_2012,
	title = {The Historically Evolving Impact of the Ogallala Aquifer: Agricultural Adaptation to Groundwater and Drought},
	year = {2012},
	month = {sep},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Agriculture on the American Great Plains has been constrained historically by water scarcity. In the latter half of the 20th century, technological improvements enabled farmers over the Ogallala aquifer to extract groundwater for large-scale irrigation. Comparing counties over the Ogallala with nearby similar counties, groundwater access increased agricultural land values and initially reduced the impact of droughts. Over time, land-use adjusted toward high-value water-intensive crops and drought-sensitivity increased. Farmers in nearby water-scarce counties have adopted lower-value drought- resistant practices that fully mitigate their naturally higher drought-sensitivity. The historically evolving impact of the Ogallala aquifer illustrates the importance of water for agricultural production, but also the large scope for agricultural adaptation to groundwater and drought.},
	author = {Hornbeck, Richard and Keskin, Pinar}
}
@booklet {drake_carbon_2012,
	title = {Carbon Tariffs: Effects in Settings with Technology Choice and Foreign Comparative Advantage},
	year = {2012},
	month = {sep},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Carbon regulation is intended to reduce global emissions, but there is growing concern that such regulation may simply shift production to unregulated regions and increase global emissions in the process. Carbon tariffs have emerged as a possible mechanism to address these concerns by imposing carbon costs on imports at the regulated region{\textquoteright}s border. I show that, when firms choose from discrete production technologies and offshore producers hold a comparative cost advantage, carbon leakage can result despite the implementation of a carbon tariff. In such a setting, foreign firms adopt clean technology at a lower emissions price than firms operating in the regulated region, with foreign entry increasing only over emissions price intervals within which foreign firms hold this technology advantage. Further, domestic firms are shown to conditionally offshore production despite the implementation of a carbon tariff, adopting cleaner technology when they do so. As a consequence, when carbon leakage does occur under a carbon tariff, it conditionally decreases global emissions. Three sources of potential welfare improvement realized through carbon tariffs require both foreign comparative advantage and endogenous technology choice, underscoring the importance of considering both in value assessments of such a policy.},
	author = {Drake, David F.}
}
@booklet {drake_technology_2012,
	title = {Technology Choice and Capacity Portfolios Under Emissions Regulation},
	year = {2012},
	month = {sep},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {We study the impact of emissions tax and emissions cap-and-trade regulation on a firm{\textquoteright}s long-run technology choice and capacity decisions. We study the problem through a two-stage, stochastic model where the firm chooses capacities in two technologies in stage one, demand uncertainty resolves between stages (as does emissions price uncertainty under cap-and-trade), and then the firm chooses production quantities. As such, we bridge the discrete choice capacity literature in Operations Management ({OM}) with the emissions-related sustainability literature in {OM} and Economics. Among our results, we show that a firm{\textquoteright}s expected profits are greater under cap-and-trade than under an emissions tax due to the option value embedded in the firm{\textquoteright}s production decision, which contradicts popular arguments that the greater uncertainty under cap-and-trade will erode value. We also show that improvements to the emissions intensity of the "dirty" type can increase the emissions intensity of the firm{\textquoteright}s optimal capacity portfolio. Through a numerical experiment grounded in the cement industry, we find emissions to be less under cap-and-trade, with technology choice driving the vast majority of the difference.},
	author = {Drake, David F. and Kleindorfer, Paul R. and Wassenhove, Luk N.}
}
@booklet {schmalensee_so2_2012,
	title = {The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment},
	year = {2012},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Two decades have passed since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 launched a grand experiment in market-based environmental policy: the {SO}2 cap-and-trade system. That system performed well but created four striking ironies. First, by creating this system to reduce {SO}2 emissions to curb acid rain, the government did the right thing for the wrong reason. Second, a substantial source of this system{\textquoteleft}s cost-effectiveness was an unanticipated consequence of earlier railroad deregulation. Third, it is ironic that cap-and-trade has come to be demonized by conservative politicians in recent years, since this market-based, cost-effective policy innovation was initially championed and implemented by Republican administrations. Fourth, court decisions and subsequent regulatory responses have led to the collapse of the {SO}2 market, demonstrating that what the government gives, the government can take away.},
	author = {Schmalensee, Richard and Stavins, Robert N.}
}
@booklet {meeks_water_2012,
	title = {Water Works: The Economic Impact of Water Infrastructure},
	year = {2012},
	month = {jul},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Billions of hours are spent each year on water collection in developing countries. This paper explores whether improvements in water technology enable changes in household time allocation patterns and, thereby, productivity gains. To do so, it exploits differences in the timing of shared public water tap construction across Kyrgyz villages to provide evidence on the extent to which such changes in time allocation are aided by access to better water infrastructure, a technology that decreases the labor intensity of home production. Households in villages that receive this labor-saving technological improvement are, on average, 15\% more likely to be within 200 meters of their water source. This, in turn, reduced the time intensity of home production activities that are impacted by water, such as bathing, going to the doctor, and caring for children. Village-level incidence of acute intestinal infections amongst children fell by 30\%. Although adults themselves show no signs of improved health, they benefit from the reductions in time spent caring for sick children. These reductions in the time intensity of home production allowed for greater time allocated towards leisure activities and market labor, specifically work on the household farm. As a result, average production of cash crops (specifically, cereals such as wheat and barley) increased by 645 kilograms per household per year. The labor supply and productivity estimates imply a rate of return to labor valuing approximately \$0.43/hour, which mirrors the hourly wage for farm labor. Taken together, these results suggest that the main channel of influence through which productivity gains were realized was increased labor supply in an environment where the classic separation of household production and consumption activities appears to hold.},
	author = {Meeks, Robyn}
}
@booklet {lu_impacts_2012,
	title = {The Impacts of Green Pigovian Taxes on Urban Inequality in China},
	year = {2012},
	month = {jul},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	author = {Lu, Eric}
}
@booklet {ranson_post-durban_2012,
	title = {Post-Durban Climate Policy Architecture Based on Linkage of Cap-and-Trade Systems},
	year = {2012},
	month = {jun},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {The outcome of the December 2011 United Nations climate negotiations in Durban, South Africa, provides an important new opportunity to move toward an international climate policy architecture that is capable of delivering broad international participation and significant global {CO}2 emissions reductions at reasonable cost. We evaluate one important component of potential climate policy architecture for the post-Durban era: links among independent tradable permit systems for greenhouse gases. Because linkage reduces the cost of achieving given targets, there is tremendous pressure to link existing and planned cap-and-trade systems, and in fact, a number of links already or will soon exist. We draw on recent political and economic experience with linkage to evaluate potential roles that linkage may play in post-Durban international climate policy, both in a near-term, de facto architecture of indirect links between regional, national, and sub-national cap-and-trade systems, and in longer-term, more comprehensive bottom-up architecture of direct links. Although linkage will certainly help to reduce long-term abatement costs, it may also serve as an effective mechanism for building institutional and political structure to support a future climate agreement.},
	author = {Ranson, Matthew and Stavins, Robert N.}
}
@booklet {li_gasoline_2012,
	title = {Gasoline Taxes and Consumer Behavior},
	year = {2012},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Gasoline taxes can be employed to correct externalities associated with automobile use, to reduce dependency on foreign oil, and to raise government revenue. Our understanding of the optimal gasoline tax and the efficacy of existing taxes is largely based on empirical analysis of consumer responses to gasoline price changes. In this paper, we directly examine how gasoline taxes affect consumer behavior as distinct from tax-exclusive gasoline prices. Our analysis shows that a 5-cent tax increase reduces gasoline consumption by 1.3 percent in the short-run, much larger than that from a 5-cent increase in the tax-exclusive gasoline price. This difference suggests that traditional analysis could significantly underestimate policy impacts of tax changes. We further investigate the differential effect from gasoline taxes and tax-exclusive gasoline prices on both the intensive and extensive margins of gasoline consumption. We discuss implications of our findings for the estimation of the implicit discount rate for vehicle purchases and for the fiscal benefits of raising taxes.},
	author = {Li, Shanjun and Linn, Joshua and Muehlegger, Erich}
}
@booklet {clemenz_unilateral_2012,
	title = {Unilateral Emission Tax and Intra-Industry Trade: An Ideal Variety},
	year = {2012},
	month = {feb},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {This paper compares total emissions of a uniformly mixing pollutant and welfare levels of a large country in autarky and with free trade with another large country that does not implement any environmental policies. There is intra-industry trade between the two countries which is modeled by using the ideal variety approach. Two abatement technologies are considered, a clean technology approach and an end-of-pipe approach. Emissions are influenced by an emission tax. With clean technology abatement emissions may be lower in the free trade regime than in autarky, with end-of-pipe abatement total emissions are greater with free trade. With both methods of abatement under free trade no emission tax may be levied at all if emissions per unit of output are very large, and if the gains from intra-industry trade due to an increase of available varieties are relatively small, autarky may yield a higher welfare level than free trade.},
	author = {Clemenz, Gerhard}
}
@booklet {chan_so2_2012,
	title = {The SO2 Allowance Trading System and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Reflections on Twenty Years of Policy Innovation},
	year = {2012},
	month = {jan},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {The introduction of the U.S. SO2 allowance-trading program to address the threat of acid rain as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 is a landmark event in the history of environmental regulation. The program was a great success by almost all measures. This paper, which draws upon a research workshop and a policy roundtable held at Harvard in May 2011, investigates critically the design, enactment, implementation, performance, and implications of this path-breaking application of economic thinking to environmental regulation. Ironically, cap and trade seems especially well suited to addressing the problem of climate change, in that emitted greenhouse gases are evenly distributed throughout the world{\textquoteright}s atmosphere. Recent hostility toward cap and trade in debates about U.S. climate legislation may reflect the broader political environment of the climate debate more than the substantive merits of market-based regulation.},
	author = {Chan, Gabriel and Stavins, Robert N. and Stowe, Robert C. and Sweeney, Richard}
}
@booklet {aldy_promise_2011,
	title = {The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience},
	year = {2011},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Because of the global commons nature of climate change, international cooperation among nations will likely be necessary for meaningful action at the global level. At the same time, it will inevitably be up to the actions of sovereign nations to put in place policies that bring about meaningful reductions in the emissions of greenhouse gases. Due to the ubiquity and diversity of emissions of greenhouse gases in most economies, as well as the variation in abatement costs among individual sources, conventional environmental policy approaches, such as uniform technology and performance standards, are unlikely to be sufficient to the task. Therefore, attention has increasingly turned to market-based instruments in the form of carbon-pricing mechanisms. We examine the opportunities and challenges associated with the major options for carbon pricing: carbon taxes, cap-and-trade, emission reduction credits, clean energy standards, and fossil fuel subsidy reductions.},
	author = {Aldy, Joseph E. and Stavins, Robert N.}
}
@booklet {aldy_using_2011,
	title = {Using the Market to Address Climate Change: Insights from Theory and Experience},
	year = {2011},
	month = {sep},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	author = {Aldy, Joseph E. and Stavins, Robert N.}
}
@booklet {glassman_evaluating_2011,
	title = {Evaluating the Economic Benefits and Future Opportunities of the Maine Island Trail Association},
	year = {2011},
	month = {may},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	author = {Glassman, Jonathan and Rao, Vilas}
}
@booklet {salovaara_coal_2011,
	title = {Coal to Natural Gas Fuel Switching and CO2 Emissions Reduction},
	year = {2011},
	month = {may},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {US natural gas prices fell in 2009 on account of weak demand and increased supply from shale gas production. The fall in prices led to a reduction in coalfired electricity generation and a concomitant increase in natural gas-fired electricity generation. Low natural gas prices conjoined with static coal prices and underutilized natural gas power plant capacity to create an environment primed for switching from natural gas to coal. Due to differences in chemical make-ups and plant efficiencies between the two fuels, this switching led to a significant reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. This thesis models how the fuel switching effect occurred and how it translated to an emissions reduction. It also analyzes several hypothetical policies aimed at augmenting the effect to achieve further reductions in emissions. Throughout the analysis, it considers the other impacts{\textemdash} environmental, human health, and economic{\textemdash}of a large-scale shift from a fuel system based on coal to one based on natural gas.},
	author = {Salovaara, Jackson}
}
@booklet {cross_value_2011,
	title = {The Value of Terroir: Hedonic Estimation of Vineyard Sale Price},
	year = {2011},
	month = {jan},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	author = {Cross, Robin and Plantinga, Andrew J. and Stavins, Robert N.}
}
@booklet {henderson_accelerating_2010,
	title = {Accelerating Energy Innovation: Insights from Multiple Sectors},
	year = {2010},
	month = {dec},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	author = {Henderson, Rebecca and Newell, Richard G.}
}
@booklet {jack_allocation_2010,
	title = {Allocation in environmental markets: A field experiment with tree planting contracts},
	year = {2010},
	month = {may},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {The use of market based instruments in developing countries is rapidly expanding, particularly in environmental policy. Several different market mechanisms theoretically lead to efficient allocation of investments in environmental quality without ex post trading, though their empirical performance in these contexts remains untested. This study provides the first evidence from a developing country field experiment to directly compare alternative allocation mechanisms: a uniform-price, sealed bid procurement auction and a posted o¤er market. The experiment was conducted in Malawi for the allocation of tree planting contracts. Results reveal highly divergent outcomes for the two strategically equivalent mechanisms. The auction set the clearing price for both mechanisms and enrolled the 38 percent of the auction treatment group that bid below the price. In the posted offer treatment group, 99.5 percent of participants accepted the contract at that price. Compliance results show significantly more trees surviving per contract allocated under the auction. Results point to a violation of procedure invariance and show a tradeoff between quantity and quality across the two mechanisms. The auction achieves a better selection of high compliance landholders, but potentially at greater cost than the posted offer market.},
	author = {Jack, B. Kelsey}
}
@booklet {behrer_building_2010,
	title = {Building in the Mountains: A hedonic analysis of the value of degraded mountain views using GIS modeling},
	year = {2010},
	month = {may},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Homebuyers make their purchase decisions based on a number of structural, environmental and neighborhood characteristics. Using Geographic Information Systems data and a hedonic price model this study attempts to empirically demonstrate the value placed on one of the environmental characteristics: unobstructed mountain views. Home sales data from Buncombe County, North Carolina in 2005 provided 626 observations, from which a log-linear model was employed to assess the impact of view degradation measured by the number of houses visible from an observer house. The study hopes to further the discussion of ideal land-use policy given the mutually exclusive nature of land development and scenic view maintenance.},
	author = {Behrer, Arnold Patrick}
}
@booklet {stavins_effect_2010,
	title = {The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System Performance},
	year = {2010},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {We examine an implication of the {\textquotedblleft}Coase Theorem{\textquotedblright} which has had an important impact both on environmental economics and on public policy in the environmental domain. Under certain conditions, the market equilibrium in a cap-and-trade system will be cost-effective and independent of the initial allocation of tradable rights. That is, the overall cost of achieving a given aggregate emission reduction will be minimized, and the final allocation of permits will be independent of the initial allocation. We call this the independence property. This property is very important because it allows equity and efficiency concerns to be separated in a relatively straightforward manner. In particular, the property means that the government can establish the overall pollution-reduction goal for a cap-and-trade system by setting the cap, and leave it up to the legislature {\textendash} such as the U.S. Congress {\textendash} to construct a constituency in support of the program by allocating the allowances to various interests without affecting either the environmental performance of the system or its aggregate social costs. Our primary objective in this paper is to examine the conditions under which the independence property is likely to hold {\textendash} both in theory and in practice. A number of factors can call the independence property into question theoretically, including market power, transaction costs, non-cost-minimizing behavior, and conditional allowance allocations. We find that, in practice, there is support for the independence property in some, but not all cap-and-trade applications.},
	author = {Stavins, Robert N. and Hahn, Robert W.}
}
@booklet {cooper_europes_2010,
	title = {Europe{\textquoteright}s Emissions Trading System},
	year = {2010},
	month = {aug},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	author = {Cooper, Richard N.}
}
@booklet {weitzman_ghg_2010,
	title = {GHG Targets as Insurance Against Catastrophic Climate Damages},
	year = {2010},
	month = {sep},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {A critical issue in climate change economics is the specification of the so-called "damages function" and its interaction with the unknown uncertainty of catastrophic outcomes. This paper asks how much we might be misled by our economic assessment of climate change when we employ a conventional quadratic damages function and/or a thin-tailed probability distribution for extreme temperatures. The paper gives some numerical examples of the indirect value of various GHG concentration targets as insurance against catastrophic climate change temperatures and damages. These numerical examples suggest that we might be underestimating considerably the welfare losses from uncertainty by using a quadratic damages function and/or a thin-tailed temperature distribution. In these examples, the primary reason for keeping GHG levels down is to insure against high-temperature catastrophic climate risks.},
	author = {Weitzman, Martin L}
}
@booklet {glaeser_greenness_2010,
	title = {The Greenness of China: Household Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Urban Development},
	year = {2010},
	month = {jan},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {China urbanization is associated with both increases in per-capita income and greenhouse gas emissions. This paper uses micro data to rank 74 major Chinese cities with respect to their household carbon footprint. We find that the {\textquotedblleft}greenest{\textquotedblright} cities based on this criterion are Huaian and Suqian while the {\textquotedblleft}dirtiest{\textquotedblright} cities are Daqing and Mudanjiang. Even in the dirtiest city (Daqing), a standardized household produces only one-fifth of that in America{\textquoteright}s greenest city (San Diego). We find that the average January temperature is strongly negatively correlated with a city{\textquoteright}s household carbon footprint, which suggests that current regional economic development policies that bolster the growth of China{\textquoteright}s northeastern cities are likely to increase emissions. We use our city specific income elasticity estimates to predict the growth of carbon emissions in China{\textquoteright}s cities.},
	author = {Edward L. Glaeser and Zheng, Siqi and Wang, Rui and Kahn, Matthew E.}
}
@booklet {goulder_interactions_2010,
	title = {Interactions between State and Federal Climate Change Policies},
	year = {2010},
	month = {jul},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Federal action addressing climate change is likely to emerge either through new legislation or via the U.S. EPA{\textquoteright}s authority under the Clean Air Act. The prospect of federal action raises important questions regarding the interconnections between federal efforts and state-level climate policy developments. In the presence of federal policies, to what extent will state efforts be cost-effective? How does the co-existence of state- and federal-level policies affect the ability of state efforts to achieve emissions reductions?
This paper addresses these questions. We find that state-level policy in the presence of a federal policy can be beneficial or problematic, depending on the nature of the overlap between the two systems, the relative stringency of the efforts, and the types of policy instruments engaged. When the federal policy sets limits on aggregate emissions quantities, or allows manufacturers or facilities to average performance across states, the emission reductions accomplished by a subset of U.S. states may reduce pressure on the constraints posed by the federal policy, thereby freeing facilities or manufacturers to increase emissions in other states. This leads to serious {\textquotedblleft}emissions leakage{\textquotedblright} and a loss of cost-effectiveness at the national level. In contrast, when the federal policy sets prices for emissions or does not allow manufactures to average performance across states, these difficulties are usually avoided. Even in circumstances involving problematic interactions, there may be other attractions of state-level climate policy. We evaluate a number of arguments that have been made to support state-level climate policy in the presence of federal policies, even when problematic interactions arise.},
	author = {Goulder, Lawrence H. and Stavins, Robert N.}
}
@booklet {frankel_natural_2010,
	title = {The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey},
	year = {2010},
	month = {sep},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {It is striking how often countries with oil or other natural resource wealth have failed to grow more rapidly than those without. This is the phenomenon known as the Natural Resource Curse. The principle is not confined to individual anecdotes or case studies, but has been borne out in some econometric tests of the determinants of economic performance across a comprehensive sample of countries. This paper considers seven aspects of commodity wealth, each of interest in its own right, but each also a channel that some have suggested could lead to sub-standard economic performance. They are: long-term trends in world commodity prices, volatility, permanent crowding out of manufacturing, poor institutions, unsustainability, war, and cyclical Dutch Disease. Skeptics have questioned the Natural Resource Curse, pointing to examples of commodity exporting countries that have done well and arguing that resource exports and booms are not exogenous. Clearly the relevant policy question for a country with natural resources is how to make the best of them. The paper concludes with a consideration of ideas for institutions that could help a country that is endowed with, for example, oil overcome the pitfalls of the Curse and achieve good economic performance. The most promising ideas include indexation of oil contracts, hedging of export proceeds, denomination of debt in terms of oil, Chilestyle fiscal rules, a monetary target that emphasizes product prices, transparent commodity funds, and lump-sum distribution.},
	author = {Frankel, Jeffrey}
}
@booklet {stavins_problem_2010,
	title = {The Problem of the Commons: Still Unsettled After 100 Years},
	year = {2010},
	month = {sep},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {The problem of the commons is more important to our lives and thus more central to economics than a century ago when Katharine Coman led off the first issue of the American Economic Review. As the U.S. and other economies have grown, the carrying-capacity of the planet{\textemdash} in regard to natural resources and environmental quality {\textemdash} has become a greater concern, particularly for common-property and open-access resources. The focus of this article is on some important, unsettled problems of the commons. Within the realm of natural resources, there are special challenges associated with renewable resources, which are frequently characterized by openaccess. An important example is the degradation of open-access fisheries. Critical commons problems are also associated with environmental quality. A key contribution of economics has been the development of market-based approaches to environmental protection. These instruments are key to addressing the ultimate commons problem of the twenty-first century {\textemdash} global climate change.},
	author = {Stavins, Robert N.}
}
@booklet {kremer_providing_2010,
	title = {Providing Safe Water: Evidence from Randomized Evaluations},
	year = {2010},
	month = {sep},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Each year, 1.6 million children die from diarrheal diseases; unsafe drinking water is a major cause. This paper reviews evidence from randomized trials on domestic water access and quality in developing countries, interpreting the results through a public economics framework. It argues that subsidies for water treatment are likely warranted, while more evidence is needed to assess the case for subsidizing programs to improve access to water. Multiple randomized trials show that water treatment can cost-effectively reduce reported diarrhea. However, many consumers have low willingness to pay for cleaner water, with less than 10\% of households purchasing household water treatment under existing retail models. Provision of information on water quality can increase demand, but only modestly. Free point of collection water treatment systems designed to make water treatment convenient, salient, and public, combined with a local promoter, can generate take up of more than 60 percent. The projected cost is as low as \$20 per year of life saved, comparable to vaccines. In contrast, the limited existing evidence suggests many consumers are willing to pay for better access to water, but it does not yet demonstrate that this improves health. Randomized impact evaluations have also generated a number of methodological insights, suggesting that: at least in some contexts, merely surveying households can lead them to change their behavior; separately randomizing offer and transaction prices does not yield evidence of sunk cost effects; revealed preference measures of clean water valuation are much lower than contingent valuation estimates; and randomized evaluations can be used to estimate parameters for structural policy simulations.},
	author = {Michael Kremer and Ahuja, Amrita and Zwane, Alex Peterson}
}
@booklet {matheny_reducing_2010,
	title = {Reducing the impact of price shocks in energy-intensive economies},
	year = {2010},
	month = {may},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	author = {Matheny, Andrew Philip}
}
@booklet {kremer_spring_2010,
	title = {Spring Cleaning: Rural Water Impacts, Valuation, and Property Rights Institutions},
	year = {2010},
	month = {sep},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Using a randomized evaluation in Kenya, we measure health impacts of spring protection, an investment that improves source water quality. We also estimate households{\textquoteright} valuation of spring protection, and simulate the welfare impacts of alternatives to the current system of common property rights in water, which limits incentives for private investment. Spring infrastructure investments reduce fecal contamination by 66\%, but household water quality improves less, due to recontamination. Child diarrhea falls by one quarter. Travel-cost based revealed preference estimates of households{\textquoteright} valuations are much smaller than both stated preference valuations and health planners{\textquoteright} valuations, and are consistent with models in which the demand for health is highly income elastic. We estimate that private property norms would generate little additional investment while imposing large static costs due to above marginal-cost pricing, private property would function better at higher income levels or under water scarcity, and alternative institutions could yield Pareto improvements.},
	author = {Michael Kremer and Miguel, Edward and Leino, Jessica and Zwane, Alex Peterson}
}
@booklet {olmstead_three_2010,
	title = {Three Key Elements of Post-2012 International Climate Policy Architecture},
	year = {2010},
	month = {jul},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {We describe three essential elements of an effective post-2012 international global climate policy architecture: a means to ensure that key industrialized and developing nations are involved in differentiated but meaningful ways; an emphasis on an extended time path of targets; and inclusion of flexible market-based policy instruments to keep costs down and facilitate international equity. This architecture is consistent with fundamental aspects of the science, economics, and politics of global climate change; addresses specific shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol; and builds upon the foundation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.},
	author = {Olmstead, Sheila M. and Stavins, Robert N.}
}
@booklet {cooper_case_2009,
	title = {The Case for Charges on Greenhouse Gas Emissions},
	year = {2009},
	month = {apr},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {The proposal discussed in this paper is to levy a common charge on all emissions of greenhouse gases, worldwide. All countries would be covered in principle, but the proposal could be implemented with a much smaller number of countries, provided they covered most of the emissions. While all greenhouse gases should in principle be covered, this paper will address mainly carbon dioxide, quantitatively the most important greenhouse gas; extensions to other greenhouse gases could be made with little or (in the case of methane) much difficulty. The charge would be internationally adjusted from time to time, and each country would collect and keep the revenue it generated. This paper will discuss in turn the motivation for such a proposal, how it would be implemented, its likely economic effects, the relationship to energy security, the possibility of mixing an emission charge with other schemes to limit emissions, especially {\textquotedblleft}cap-and-trade{\textquotedblright} schemes, and the negotiability of such an agreement.},
	author = {Cooper, Richard N.}
}
@booklet {stavins_comparing_2009,
	title = {Comparing Price and Non-Price Approaches to Urban Water Conservation},
	year = {2009},
	month = {apr},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Urban water conservation is typically achieved through prescriptive regulations, including the rationing of water for particular uses and requirements for the installation of particular technologies. A significant shift has occurred in pollution control regulations toward market-based policies in recent decades. We offer an analysis of the relative merits of marketbased and prescriptive approaches to water conservation, where prices have rarely been used to allocate scarce supplies. The analysis emphasizes the emerging theoretical and empirical evidence that using prices to manage water demand is more cost-effective than implementing non-price conservation programs, similar to results for pollution control in earlier decades. Price-based approaches may also compare favorably to prescriptive approaches in terms of monitoring and enforcement. Neither policy instrument has an inherent advantage over the other in terms of predictability and equity. As in any policy context, political considerations are also important.},
	author = {Stavins, Robert N. and Olmstead, Sheila M.}
}
@booklet {zeckhauser_dreadful_2009,
	title = {Dreadful Possibilities, Neglected Probabilities},
	year = {2009},
	month = {apr},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	author = {Zeckhauser, Richard and Sunstein, Cass R.}
}
@booklet {frankel_jeffrey_elaborated_2009,
	title = {An Elaborated Proposal for Global Climate Policy Architecture: Specific Formulas and Emission Targets for All Countries in All Decades},
	year = {2009},
	month = {apr},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {This paper offers a detailed plan to set quantitative national limits on emissions of greenhouse gases, building on the foundation of the Kyoto Protocol. It attempts to fill in the most serious gaps: the absence of targets extending as far as 2100, the absence of participation by the United States and developing countries, and the absence of reason to think that countries will abide by commitments. The plan elaborates on the idea of a framework of formulas that can assign quantitative limits across countries, one budget period at a time. Unlike other proposals for century-long paths of emission targets that are based purely on science (concentration goals) or economics (cost-benefit optimization), this plan is based partly on politics. Three political constraints are particularly important. (1) Developing countries are not asked to bear any cost in the early years. (2) Thereafter, they are not asked to make any sacrifice that is different in kind or degree than was made by those countries that went before them, with due allowance for differences in incomes. (3) No country will accept an ex ante target that costs it more than 1\% of GDP in present value, or more than 5\% of {GDP} in any single budget period, or will abide by it ex post. An announced target path that implies a future violation of these constraints will not be credible, and thus will not provide the necessary signals to firms today. Thus paper tries out specific values for the parameters in the formulas (parameters that govern the extent of progressivity and equity, and the speed with which latecomers must eventually catch up). The resulting target paths for emissions are run through the WITCH model. The outcome is reasonable, in terms of both carbon abatement and economic cost, even though the targets obey the political constraints.},
	author = {Frankel, Jeffrey}
}
@booklet {stavins_environmental_2009,
	title = {Environmental Economics},
	year = {2009},
	month = {apr},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {This article provides an overview of the economics of environmental policy, including the setting of goals and targets, notably the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and the related method of assessment known as benefit-cost analysis. Also reviewed are the means of environmental policy, that is, the choice of specific policy instruments, featuring an examination of potential criteria for assessing alternative instruments, with focus on cost-effectiveness. The theoretical foundations and experiential highlights of individual instruments are reviewed, including conventional command-and-control mechanisms and market-based instruments.},
	author = {Stavins, Robert N.}
}
@booklet {frankel_global_2009,
	title = {Global Environmental Policy and Global Trade Policy},
	year = {2009},
	month = {apr},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {The global climate regime and the global trade policy regime are on a collision course. National efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) instill among environmentalists fears of leakage and among businesspeople fears of lost competitiveness. Policy-makers respond to these fears. In 2008, legislative attempts in both Washington, DC, and Brussels to enact long-term targets for reduced emission of GHGs included provisions for possible penalties against imports from countries perceived as non-participating. Trade measures, if well designed, could in theory be WTO-compatible, in light of the precedent of the shrimp-turtle case, in particular. But the actual provisions emerging from the political process are likely to violate the rules of the WTO, which poses the scenario of a WTO panel rejecting a major country{\textquoteright}s climate change legislation. That would be a nightmare for the supporters of the WTO and free trade as much as for the supporters of the Kyoto Protocol and environmental protection. The issue is just the latest and largest instance of fears among many environmentalists that the WTO is an obstacle to their goals in general. For many critics, the WTO is a symbol of globalization, which they fear. The first part of this paper discusses the broader issue of whether environmental goals in general are threatened by the global free trade system. The paper then focuses exclusively on the narrower question of trade measures in the effort to implement climate change policy and whether they are likely to be successful. It concludes with specific recommendations for how border measures could be designed so that they were more likely to be true to the goal of reducing leakage and yet consistent with the WTO.},
	author = {Frankel, Jeffrey}
}
@booklet {stavins_linkage_2009,
	title = {Linkage of Tradable Permit Systems in International Climate Policy Architecture},
	year = {2009},
	month = {apr},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	author = {Stavins, Robert N. and Jaffe, Judson}
}
@booklet {zeckhauser_overreaction_2009,
	title = {Overreaction to Fearsome Risks},
	year = {2009},
	month = {apr},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	author = {Zeckhauser, Richard and Sunstein, Cass R.}
}
@booklet {weitzman_reactions_2009,
	title = {Reactions to the Nordhaus Critique},
	year = {2009},
	month = {apr},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {In this paper I comment on the reactions of William Nordhaus to a recent article of mine entitled "On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change" that appeared in the February 2009 issue of the Review of Economics and Statistics. My target audience here is PhD-level general economists, but this paper could also be viewed as a somewhat less technical supplement to my article, which some interested non-economist readers might conceivably find useful on its own account.},
	author = {Weitzman, Martin L}
}
@booklet {weitzman_basic_2009,
	title = {Some Basic Economics of Extreme Climate Change},
	year = {2009},
	month = {apr},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	abstract = {Climate change is characterized by deep structural uncertainty in the science coupled with an economic inability to evaluate meaningfully the welfare losses from high temperature changes. The probability of a disastrous collapse of planetary welfare from too much CO2 is non-negligible, even if this low probability is not objectively knowable. This paper attempts to explain (in not excessively technical language) some of the most basic issues in modeling the economics of catastrophic climate change. The paper builds to a tentative conclusion that, no matter what else is done realistically to slow CO2 buildups, economic analysis lends some support to undertaking serious research now into the prospects of "fast geoengineering preparedness"{\textendash}as a state-contingent emergency option offering at least the possibility of knocking down catastrophic temperatures rapidly.},
	author = {Weitzman, Martin L}
}
@booklet {zeckhauser_virgin_2009,
	title = {Virgin Versus Experienced Risks},
	year = {2009},
	month = {apr},
	publisher = {Harvard Environmental Economics Program},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, {USA}},
	author = {Zeckhauser, Richard and Kousky, Carolyn and Pratt, John}
}
@booklet {cooper_case_2008,
	title = {The Case for Charges on Greenhouse Gas Emissions},
	number = {08-10},
	year = {2008},
	publisher = {Harvard Project on Climate Agreements},
	type = {Discussion Paper},
	address = {Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA},
	abstract = {The proposal discussed in this paper is to levy a common charge on all emissions of greenhouse gases, worldwide. All countries would be covered in principle, but the proposal could be implemented with a much smaller number of countries, provided they covered most of the emissions. While all greenhouse gases should in principle be covered, this paper will address mainly carbon dioxide, quantitatively the most important greenhouse gas; extensions to other greenhouse gases could be made with little or (in the case of methane) much difficulty. The charge would be internationally adjusted from time to time, and each country would collect and keep the revenue it generated. This paper will discuss in turn the motivation for such a proposal, how it would be implemented, its likely economic effects, the relationship to energy security, the possibility of mixing an emission charge with other schemes to limit emissions, especially "cap-and-trade" schemes, and the negotiability of such an agreement.},
	url = {http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18633},
	author = {Cooper, Richard N.}
}
